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ABSTRACT 
Budget allocation of the couples belongs to the field of family finance management, 
but also represents a source of dispute among them, which directed the research of this topic 
towards family therapy and psychology. This paper will offer quantitative approach, imple-
menting Cournot’s duopoly model to a situation of a couple’s budget allocation. That will 
emphasis the underlying economic principles, as well as show that there exists an equilib-
rium solution or an equilibrium set of possible solutions.
Keywords:  
applied game theory, couple decision-making, family finance management
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1. INTRODUCTION
this paper will consider a newly wedded couple deciding on the amount of mon-
ey they should save or invest. they both understand that it is useful to save money, 
but the deviation tendency for spending money is high. However, for the purpose of 
this paper this couple will aim for a rational answer. We will assume that one person 
prefers to spend the money, while the other prefers to save the money. the two play-
ers compete over the dominance of the budget. that provides the situation frame-
work which requires game theory as a methodology. therefore, this situation will be 
modeled using game theory framework, precisely cournot’s model. game theory is 
mathematical discipline dedicated to analysis and anticipating human behavior in 
strategic situations. requirements of the game theory also have to be satisfied: there 
has to be at least two players, players have to interact strategically, feasible strategies 
have to be described, as well as available information, pay offs and players’ prefer-
ences regarding the pay offs. that will result in formalization of bargaining stage on 
personal budget allocation. 
the application of the cournot’s model to a situation where a couple has to de-
cide on saving and spending of their limited budget will show that (1) division of the 
limited budget by a couple follows same economic principles as duopoly market divi-
sion; (2) there is an equilibrium solution or an equilibrium set of possible solutions. 
in addition, offered equilibrium solution can be adjusted/ extended and compared to 
existing models questioning the deviations from the equilibrium, such as deviation 
towards non reporting income, expenses for child from previous marriage, trans-
fers given the amount of caring and deviations due to personality characteristics. the 
model results can relate to existing model’s results providing a simulation with em-
pirical data as confirmation for each.
secondary data will be implemented in the model using compilation method. 
the aim of this model is to answer what is the optimal behavior of participants in 
observed game from a new, different perspective, such that it can be applicable both 
in everyday life and can serve for further scientific research and model development. 
moreover, this cournot’s model implementation can serve as a basis for future em-
pirical research of this topic. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
financial arguments are common part of couples’ interaction, and has been 
previously documented and studied by numerous authors. family financial man-
agement requires decision-making of many situations, such as spending, savings, 
retirement plan, buying choices, plan for children and their expenses, residence 
choice, and so on. godwin (1990) noticed that at the time, there was many literatures 
on what couples should do, but very few research on how couples actually behave in 
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this situations. since then, a numerous researches have been conducted and most 
of them found that financial problems and financial argument influence marital 
satisfaction (Kerkmann et al., 2000). lawrence et at (1993), found that savings and 
pursuing goals were negatively correlated with arguing, and cost-cutting strategies, 
delaying and do-it-yourself are positively correlated to arguments. the same author 
relays of the research of goodman, 1986, mitchell and Zalenski, 1985, Yankelovich, 
skelly, & White, 1975, which found that from one-third to over one-half of their re-
spondents argue about finances.
guiso and sodini (2013) use the term household finance, and state related issues 
such as financial mistakes, financial literacy, portfolio allocation, debt decision and 
consumer financial regulation. According to these authors, “household finance is 
the normative and positive study of how households use financial markets to achieve 
their objectives”. even though they pointed out to required interdisciplinarity when 
dealing to this topic, they do not engage deeply into decision-making process.
further literature review shows that the research of this topic has been trans-
ferred from personal finance to the field of family therapy and self-help psychology 
(post, 2005, Wilson, 2012). Almost forty years after first significant studies in this 
field, Queen at al., (2013) state that research on decision making in couples is yet 
at an early stage of development. the same authors develop framework for decision 
making process in couples regarding to decision context, individual characteristics, 
other social partners and how it effects on the quality of the process. However, au-
thors insist on collaborative decision making. 
modeling cooperative decision making enables forming a descriptive frame-
work, which can be loosely defined for each situation, and in best case shows direc-
tion of the decision. the lack of this approach is that enables achieving uniquely de-
fined outcome or a set of possible outcomes. if one wants to do that, should use non 
cooperative decision making. in combination with other parameters which can be 
observed in this situation, such as two persons who strategically interact, have dif-
ferent preferences over outcomes and have to agree on making a financial decision, 
form a framework which requires game theory methodology. 
game theory deals with situations of conflict between two or more participants. 
the aim is to determine the behavior of participants that best for them, assuming 
they are rational. conflict is regulated by strict rules, and the solution of conflicts is 
determined by the actions of all parties to the conflict. the rules specify the behavior 
of players. strategy is a comprehensive plan of action, the rules of the decision or 
set of instructions that players must abide by taking into account all available prior 
information about the game (brkić, 2003). Also, it is important to make distinc-
tion between the use of terms of cooperation, as in terms of possibility of making an 
agreement and as cooperative game theory model which implies that the rules can 
be changed during the game. non cooperative, formal models can also allow pos-
sibility of making an agreement, moreover the equilibrium solution can be observed 
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as a rational point of an agreement. the distinction is noted by malapit (2012: 2), 
“cooperation implies that couples pool their resources and then jointly decide how 
these resources are allocated, be it through consensus, nash bargaining, or some 
other collective decision making. *** noncooperation implies that individuals al-
locate their own resources according to their personal preferences”.  After clarifi-
cation of the terms, authors use formal model in order to determine situations in 
which spouses have motivation to hide their income. they find that in patriarchal 
or matriarchal systems, a non-deciding person has a tendency to hide their income. 
conrad and lommerud (2000) offer cornout - nash equilibrium model of non-co-
operative marriage. Ashraf (2009) shows that in jointly made decisions over budget 
allocation partners report less money, or keep a secret stash of money. regarding the 
bargaining power, influences of threat points such as divorce or departure (lund-
berg, pollak, 1993; mcelroy, Horney, 1981). beside the bargaining power, there are 
additional influence factors included in modelling budget allocation that can reflect 
on newlywed couple budget allocation decision, such as expenditure on children 
from previous marriages (del bocca, flinn, 1994). chen and Woolley (1999) formed 
a cournot-nash model for a family decision making and examined the transfers 
within the household given the amount of caring between the spouses. According to 
carter and Katz (1997), only transfers within the household are subjective to coop-
erative decision making.  
decision making and interaction in real life are usually not susceptible to sim-
ple rules. especially at individual level, where personal characteristics take place. 
the clear connection of personal characteristics to decision-making in game theory 
has been shown by tay et al. (2006), nassiri - mofakham (2007, 2009), roozmand 
(2011), and Škare and Kostelić (2015). therefore, it is advisable to include behavioral 
characteristics, as a part of the model, or at least as an orienting parameter. different 
kind of behavioral characteristics which represent the boundaries for rational deci-
sion making, systematized by Kahneman and tversky (2003) are called heuristics, 
biases and cognitive illusions. for the purpose of this paper, personal characteristic 
will be noted as an orienting factor regarding the preference of outcome.
influences such as domestic violence (tauchen et al., 1991), division of house-
work (lundberg, pollak,1993; Konrad, lommerud, 1995), and long-term repeated 
interaction (chiappori, 1992), investment in mutual children (ott, 1995) will be 
disregarded due to the nature of the observed situation. this paper will not discuss 
sequential interaction, or question consumer or savings choices such as buying pref-
erences or choice of financial products or financial literacy.
this regards to a loosely defined correction parameter of the existential spend-
ing. there is a part of the budget required for existential expenses which is usually 
formed at the national level for four-member monthly necessary expenses (average 
consumer basket). so, this part of the budget must not be part of the division on the 
spending and the savings amongst the partners. the average consumer basket has to 
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be corrected for the number of family members, additional income in family, pref-
erences, personality and life style.
3. METHODOLOGY 
Game description. in following game two persons have to define amounts for 
savings and spending from the mutual budget. We assume that the players have done 
the market research regarding the products and interest rates. Also, we assume that 
savings is the first person’s preference, while second person prefers spending.
cournot’s model will be used because, in its emphasized features, situation reminds 
of a duopoly, two companies of approximately same market power compete for the share 
of the limited market. each person of the couple is an agent choosing an amount of the 
limited budget. Applying the cournot’s model (gibbons, 1992: 14-21; mas coleil, Whin-
ston, green, 1995: 389 - 394, rasmusen, 2006: 84-86), to the informal declaration of 
the personal budget allocation is translated into static game of complete information.
the model will be enriched with secondary data. the data source is croatian bu-
reau of statistics. the statistical report “revision of data on basic characteristics of 
household consumption” provides the data necessary to determine the monthly life 
expenses. the statistical report “statistical Yearbook of the republic of croatia” and 
the data is obtained from croatian employment service regarding every employed 
person in croatia. the personal characteristics for implementation in the model will 
be used from the paper Škare and Kostelić (2015). 
Assumptions. first assumption is that static model of complete information 
can explain the personal budget allocation game. let the 1m  and 2m denote the 
amount of the money, at the disposal of the first and second player, respectively. 
let the 
denotes the possible utility from the savings, where 
21 mmM +=
)(Mu denotes savings utility, b denotes the amount of joint budget diminished 
for average cost of life expenses, M is total amount of available joint budget, 1m  
denotes the chosen savings amount of the first player, and 2m  denotes the chosen 
spending amount of the second player. 
this leads to utility functions, where )( 1Uf , utility function of the first player 
is defined by the preference for investment, while )( 2Uf the second player’s utility 
function is defined by the investment diminished by discounting factor revealing his 
preference for spending. respectively, 
.
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where r  is interest rate.
As it can be noticed, the preferences shape the perception of the gain, which is 
implemented in the utility function. While first utility function shows preference of 
21 mm > , the second utility function shows preference of 21 mm < .
there can be derived also a payoff function, π 
where U  denotes utility (result of utility function), c  is investment cost, and 
m is chosen amount of savings.
from this it can be noticed that in observed situation is true 
. the utility functions are different, hence 
payoff functions are different, so the perceived benefit from the equal amount of sav-
ings is different for each player. 
furthermore, a condition bM <  has to be satisfied. parameter b denotes a 
part of the budget which remains after subtracting average cost of living corrected for 
factors (number of family members, additional income in family, preferences, life 
style...) from the total income. therefore, the amount that remains for spending and 
for the investment must not exceed b. otherwise, the situation becomes unsustain-
able and the family existence is violated, and payoffs tend to 0.
if , then 0)( =Mu . let’s assume that the total cost of obtaining savings 
product is , hence marginal cost is denoted with constant c, bcc <= ,0 .
strategies available for each player regard to the choice of the different amount 
of budget to obtain. negative quantities are not feasible strategies. given that, the 
set of feasible strategies is , where strategy 1s  denotes chosen amount 
of money 0, 11 >mm .
the payoff function for the first player is defined with the payoff functions and 
the choice of the other player, ),( 211 ssu . let the payoff functions are defined with 
utility which both players gain, which is rewritten:
Lemma.  if a strategy pair is nash equilibrium, for each player has to 
be true , for each feasible strategy . in addition, it has to 
,
38
REVIEW OF INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS VOLUME 2  |  ISSUE 2  |  2016
solve the optimization problem . 
respectively, in provided framework is valid 
it is assumed that is necessary and sufficient condition for optimi-
zation of the first player strategy and leads to  
if the strategy pair of chosen amounts of money, ),( *2
*
1, mm is nash equilibrium, 
then for the players rational choices must be true: 
and           .
Proof. if, for example, first player would choose to regard to the available budget 
amount monopolistically, he would choose Mm =1 , which leads to maximization 
of his pay off function, , . given that there are two 
players, they would maximize their benefits only if aggregated amounts are equal to 
monopolistic quantity, which leads to . According to previous derivation it 
can be seen that  is not the best answer of the first player to the choice of 
the second player, because it leads to violating condition that M must not exceed b. 
that leads to unsustainability of the family existence, and payoffs tend to 0. Hence, 
 is the best answer to any chosen amount by second player. 
4. RESULTS 
When solving the set of equations, it results in 
which satisfies presumed conditions. 
this provides the framework form implementation of empirical data.
Average consumption expenditures (existential) per household in 2014 for a 
four-member family is 81315 Kuna/ yearly or 6776,25 Kuna monthly (revision of 
.
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data on basic characteristics of household consumption1, 2014: 2), average monthly 
earnings in croatia was 5533 Kuna in 2014 (statistical Yearbook of the republic of 
croatia 2 2015: 174).
if we assume that observed newlywed couple has average consumption expen-
ditures and both spouses earn average paycheck, we get that joint budget amount is 11 
066,00 Kuna, and monthly consumption expenditures is 3 388,13 Kuna. that means 
that after covering basic expenses couple has to decide how much to save and spend 
of the amount of 7 677,87 Kuna. if we implement the data to the previously described 
situation, we get  Kuna. given that the amount of the living 
cost is corrected only for number of family members, but not for the other factors, it 
is possible to define that  Kuna, where couple is indifferent to their 
allocation, as long as it is within the interval.
furthermore, tendency for deviation has to be explained. 
Deviation towards non-reporting income. 
if one of the players would choose to treat the available budget amount 
monopolistically, and would choose 1m , he would maximize own profit of , 
using the amount of money , and gaining . given that there 
are two players, they can only maximize profit if the aggregated amounts of budget 
are equal to the monopolistic amount. deviation towards the monopolistic amount 
of each player would lead to family survival violation.
so, it can be assumed that the decision maker will choose equilibrium solution, 
but the non - decision maker will tend to hide money and create a secret stash re-
gardless to the second person preferences. 
let the tendency for deviation is arbitrary quantified to, d = 1000 Kuna. the joint 
budget amount is now 10 066,00 Kuna, and monthly consumption expenditures 
remain 3 388,13 Kuna. that means that after covering basic expenses couple has to 
decide how much to save and spend of the amount of 6 677,87 Kuna. if we implement 
the data to the previously described situation, we get  Kuna.
the received amount enables non - decision maker to retain control over the 
budget and generate individual benefit, but diminishes benefit pay offs for both 
players within the game framework. 
1 "the selected sample for 2014 included 4160 dwellings occupied by private households, out of which 
2029 private households were successfully interviewed. the response rate at the household level was 
54%“ (2014:1)
2 "the labour cost survey includes all persons employed in legal entities selected into the sample who 
signed a work contract with an employer for a fixed or specified period of time, irrespective of whether 
they worked full time or less than full time and who received wage. persons who worked on the basis 
of work agreements or author’s contracts, contracts with juveniles’ and students’ employment services, 
pupils and students in training and employees who did not receive salaries are excluded.“ (2015:173)
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Deviation because of expenditure on children from previous marriages. 
expenditure on children from previous marriage is a court-ordered obligation, 
hence increases the amount of monthly consumption expenditures. According to the 
croatian law (314.,4.; nn75/14), the obligatory expenditure on children from previ-
ous marriages for a parent who earns from 5501 - 6500 Kuna is 1190 Kuna for a child 
up to 6 years old; 1392 Kuna for a child of 7 - 12 years; 1525 Kuna for a child of 13 - 18 
years. Hence, average obligatory expenditure on children is 1369 Kuna. 
so, applying this deviation, we get joint budget amount is 11 066.00 Kuna, and 
monthly consumption expenditures is 4 757.13 Kuna (assuming that there is only one 
child support payed monthly). that means that after covering basic expenses couple 
has to decide how much to save and spend of the amount of 6308,87 Kuna. if we im-
plement the data to the previously described situation, we get  
Kuna.
given that the received amount diminishes benefit pay offs for both players is 
caused by only one player, the other person has a reason for applying tit for tat strat-
egy which causes deviation from equilibrium solution. the person can do that by 
keeping the same amount for self or keeping a secret stash. that would diminish the 
joint budget amount to 9 697 Kuna, leading to choosing amounts of spending and 
saving of  Kuna. 
it is obvious that this behavior, even though justified, leads only to further di-
minishing benefit pay offs for both players from mutual budget allocation within the 
game framework.
Deviation due to transfers within the household given the amount of 
caring.
for the purpose of examination of the influence of the amount of caring to the 
household transfers to the equilibrium solution, it is necessary to implement a car-
ing parameter as a preference in the equations.
it is assumed that “caring parameter” contributes to the utility function of one 
player by increase the utility function of other player. if first player prefers savings 
over spending and cares for the other player , then his payoff func-
tion is defined as . that leads to  , while for 
the purpose of this example, second player remains with his equilibrium choice, 
. that leads to , respectively allowing the second player choice 
.
this deviation can explain money transfer among the partners where are no ex-
pectations in return. in this situation, the amount chosen for savings will be 1919.46 
Kuna, while amount chosen for spending will be 3199.11 Kuna. in this case, there is 
a transfer of 639,83 Kuna from savings to spending due to 0.5 factor of first player 
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caring for second player. if the second player responds in reciprocity, the observed 
amount (or a part of it, depending on caring parameter) will be transferred back to 
the first player.
it can be noticed that the chosen amount of spending violates the first equilibri-
um outcome set  Kuna. However, achieved amounts do not vio-
late presumption bmm <+ *2
*
1 , hence they are feasible choices - just not the optimal 
ones. 
Deviation due to personal characteristics.
if we assume that observed newlywed couple has some differences over the per-
sonality characteristics, and/or general attitudes, we can expect deviation from the 
equilibrium solution regarding the differences over choosing amount of saving and 
spending, consumer choices, general preferences, interests, as well as differences over 
negotiation tactics, communication style, strategies and perception of rational choices.
the differences over negotiation tactics and communication style can be exam-
ined in an iterated communication model, namely dynamic model, which exceeds 
the scope of this paper. the similar situation occurs with discussion of consumer 
choices and interests.
for the purpose of the discussion of deviation due to personal characteristics, 
perception of rational choice will be examined. thinking - feeling is a personality 
trait from mbti personality trait indicator used in modeling a negotiation situa-
tion by Škare and Kostelić (2015). it is a personality trait which distinguishes peo-
ple who generally tend to make rational choices and people who tend to make emo-
tional choices. let the first player to be rational and second player emotional. it can 
be assumed that rational player will strive for equilibrium solution, which is rational 
choice. on the other side, emotional decision makers tend to make impulsive deci-
sions without giving much thought about it. therefore, sudden expenses can occur. 
emotional decision maker, if aware of own habits, could decide to keep a part 
of the income for him/ her-self in order to ensure enough resources for impulsive 
choices. that leads to the same outcome as in already observed example with hiding 
income. the rational player should anticipate such behavior and suggest this strategy 
if the emotional player does not come up with that option (in order to forestall pos-
sible future disputes). 
for the purpose of this example, let the emotional player chooses to keep for 
himself 500 Kuna. Joint budget amount is 10 566,00 Kuna, and after covering ba-
sic expenses couple has to decide how much to save and spend of the amount of 
7177,87 Kuna. if we implement the data to the previously described situation, we 
get  Kuna. this result fits the assumed set of possible outcomes 
 Kuna, where couple is indifferent to their allocation, as long as it is 
within the interval.
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However, the rational player should decide over keeping his part of the budget 
at disposal for allocation for mutual savings or spending or to keep the same amount 
of his budget for him/ her-self. rational choice would be to keep the same amount of 
his budget for him/her-self, as a tit for tat strategy, which leads to the same outcome 
as in the example of expenditure on child from previous marriage. in that case, joint 
budget amount is 10 066,00 Kuna, and after covering basic expenses couple has to 
decide how much to save and spend of the amount of 6 677,87 Kuna. When we imple-
ment the, we get  Kuna.
nevertheless, the rational player could have a caring parameter due to which 
could decide to leave his part of the budget for allocation to mutual savings and 
spending as a form of transfer given the amount of caring. this does not necessary 
question his rationality. the caring parameter is implemented in his payoff func-
tion, so a following transfer is rational choice for that player, given the presumption 
of caring. However, it can be discussed in terms of subjective rationality, given that 
the outcome does not follow simple optimization problem providing objectively ra-
tional solution. subjective rationality can be modeled within the game using both 
endogenous and exogenous parameters providing a solution which better explains 
individual choices, but deviates from the classic equilibrium solution. in this case, 
implementation of caring parameter means that player’s choices will be guided by 
specific personal characteristic, but the outcome will still have an underlining ra-
tionality (transfer is rational choice given the player payoff function).
this situation could be modeled in two ways. if we start from the complete 
budget situation, the caring parameter ascribed to the other player’s choice amount 
would lead to the similar situation as in the example of deviation due to transfers 
within the household given the amount of caring. the difference is that in this situ-
ation transfer among the players enables that emotional player keeps an amount for 
impulsive spending (not receiving an amount from the partner, but keeping his own, 
while partner’s money remains in joint budget and is used for allocation on spending 
and savings). second option is to start from the situation after emotional player has 
retained the amount and the rational player has played tit for tat. if the transfer oc-
curs in this situation, then the caring parameter should not be assigned to emotional 
player’s chosen amount, but to utility from mutual savings and spending. 
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5. DISCUSSION
this model describes a glimpse of reality, but it can be used as an example of 
rational choice in interpersonal bargaining over budget allocation. Although many 
financial decisions relay on emotions, practice showed that rational choice is pref-
erable in this situation. the presumption of rationality in decision-making process 
can be critique for this model. the counter argument is that biases and heuristics 
related to decision-making regarding financial decisions tend to lead to poorer deci-
sions, respectively smaller payoff. models are often used as an assistance in decision-
making. this can be a simple solution manual for this sort of situations, given that it 
is stated that financial decisions tend to lead to a dispute. moreover, given that the 
model can easily be adjusted for each situation it can serve as a simple application. 
each model represents a sort of caricature or abstraction of the situation. the 
emphasized features of the situation of budget division among spender and saver in 
the family, look much alike the situation of the duopoly. that was the motivation for 
the cournot’s model application. the application of the model itself, shows that as-
sumptions and calculations follow both original model and logical flow. therefore, 
follows that division of the limited budget by a couple follows same economic princi-
ples as duopoly market division.
given that it was possible to satisfy the required assumptions, the game mod-
el provided necessary calculations to achieve the equilibrium outcome. there is a 
unique solution if we assume player’s rationality and disregard behavioral parame-
ter, and decision interval if behavioral parameter is considered. However, that shows 
that there is an equilibrium solution or an equilibrium set of possible solutions for 
the application of the cournot’s model to a situation where a couple has to decide 
on saving and spending of their limited budget. in addition, specific situations have 
been discussed, such as deviation towards non reporting income, expenses for child 
from previous marriage, transfers given the amount of caring and deviations due to 
personality characteristics have been examined and shown that the model results can 
relate to existing models providing an empirical simulation confirmation for each. 
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6. CONCLUSION
this paper provides an insight on decision-making process in personal budget 
allocation. if there are two parties with different preferences, decision may be harder 
to achieve, but nevertheless it is possible and shown by applying cournot’s model to 
observed situation. moreover, it proves that (1) division of the limited budget by a 
couple follows same economic principles as duopoly market division; and following 
(2) there is an equilibrium solution or an equilibrium set of possible solutions.
given that financial decision-making provokes the argument amongst the cou-
ples, the conclusions from the game can provide a simple solution manual for this 
sort of situations. moreover, the model could easily be adjusted for each situation 
with specific parameter implementation and it can serve as a simple application. 
Hence, there is possible use of the findings in everyday life. 
this paper represents a framework which can be further developed in future re-
search. possible future research is regarding the communication iteration, develop-
ment of behavioral parameter in the model, as well as inclusion of heuristics, biases 
and cognitive illusions in decision-making process.
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